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ABSTRACT
This paper is a result of a structured thesis project to investigate
the linkage of strategy and technology at corporations. More specifi-
cally, the research has been aimed at finding and analyzing situations
where Information Services (I/S) technology has pushed firms in new
strategic directions. A research framework has been used to separate
the key characteristics of selected firms so that a clearer analytical
perspective can be obtained.
This paper has focused on the Communications Satellite Corporation
(Comsat) and its subsidiary, Satellite Television Corporation (STC).
Comsat is an interesting corporation for this study, because it is an
I/S technology company. That is, the most significant I/S technologies
are found in its products and services, as opposed to internal busi-
ness uses. The technology examined in this paper has been the Direct
Broadcasting Satellite (DBS) pay television service proposed by STC.
While it appears that strategy at Comsat is heavily technology-based,
in the case of STC, it does not appear that technology is "driving"
strategy. However, an interesting strategic analysis of the high-
risk DBS venture, and a discussion of its possible implications to
Comsat, have been presented.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Michael S. Scott Morton
Title: Professor of Management
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Chapter I. Introduction
This paper is the product of a structured thesis project,
sponsored by the Center for Information Systems Research, and
directed by Michael S. Scott Morton, Professor of Management at
M.I.T. The general purpose of this project is to conduct preliminary
research on the interaction between business strategy and "information
services" (I/S) technology at several U.S. corporations. Specifically,
the project seeks to generate new information, and possibly
hypotheses, concerning situations where I/S technology has created
new strategic business opportunities.
For the purpose of this project I/S technology is broadly defined
to include:
"1) The computer activity (operations, programming and systems
design) across the full range of companies from micros to
maxis;
2) communications (broad and narrow band, voice, data, and
video);
3) white collar productivity/office automation, and;
4) blue collar productivity (robotics, process control, etc.)."1
An important trend is that these technologies are rapidly evolving
and increasingly overlap with each other.
It is also important to distinguish between I/S technology used
for internal business management and that presented as a product
or service. Each can present strategic opportunities for a firm;
the former in terms of significantly altering the cost structure of
the firm, and the latter as a vehicle for entering new markets or
providing new products/services. In either case, it is clear that I/S
5.
technology can have a significant impact on a firm.
The members of this thesis project are using a particular frame-
work, (see Exhibit 1), as a tool to characterize the actions and
attributes of each of the corporations being examined. The frame-
work represents a corporation as five "boxes" within a dynamic
external environment. There are four major ones: Strategy, Technology,
Organization, and Individuals, all tied together by the central
Management Processes box. Each of these boxes interacts with the
others, shaping the character, products, and strategic direction of
the firm.2
This thesis project is primarily concerned with the interaction
between the technology box, meaning I/S technology, and the strategy
box. Specifically, we are looking for I/S technologies that are
pushing firms in new strategic directions. A secondary concern is
the effect of this interaction on the other boxes, or vice-versa,
where these other boxes affect the strategy-technology linkage.
Within this project our approach is to describe the overall firm in
terms of this framework. Then, the framework is used again to provide
a more detailed description, and basis for analysis, of a particular
strategy-technology issue.
The subject firm of this thesis paper is the Communications
Satellite Corporation (Comsat) of Washington, D.C. Comsat is a particu-
larly interesting corporation to analyze because it is a major
player in the rapidly evolving telecommunications industry. This
fact creates a number of strategic threats and opportunities for the
firm, and as a result, it too is rapidly changing. In terms of our
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framework, there is a great deal of action around the strategy-
technology linkage and all the boxes at the firm are significantly
affected.
However, Comsat presents an interesting twist to our project's
preliminary proposition and concept of I/S technology. Whereas
the project envisions internal I/S technology driving a firm in
new strategic directions, this is not true at Comsat. The firm is
in the information technology business, and therefore, the most
interesting and significant technologies are found in its products
and services.
While this observation has changed the approach of our analysis,
Comsat is still very relevant to our project. There is still a
great deal to be learned by examining the strategy-technology
linkage at the firm. The continuous question throughout our
discussions has been whether products/services at Comsat are primarily
technology or market (strategy) driven. These two boxes are
intricately intertwined in a technology company such as Comsat,
and cause and effect are very difficult to separate. In almost all
cases technology plays a critical part in the firm's strategy, but
market considerations are increasing in importance.
The understanding and control of this interaction is critical for
Comsat. As it faces an increasingly deregulated and competitive
environment in the telecommunications industry, it can no longer rely
simply on technological achievements to succeed. Instead, it must
use its technologies within a planned strategic context. Comsat has
recognized this problem and is evolving its corporate culture and
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and management systems to effectively balance technology with
strategy.
This paper is one of three written about Comsat in connection
with this thesis project. The authors of the other two papers
are Nancy Greenbaum and Shuhaku Aoki. Both individually and as
a group, we have met with a wide range of managers in several
different divisions and subsidiaries of Comsat. Through these
interviews, and through current literature review, we have pieced
together a picture of the firm in terms of the boxes of our
framework described above. Each of us has incorporated this
picture, composed jointly to some extent, within our papers.
The subject of this paper falls directly out of the other two
papers concerning Comsat. Mr. Aoki's paper deals with the broad
issue of Comsat's strategic positioning within the changing
telecommunications industry. His purpose is to examine the
strategy-technology issue from a macro or industry viewpoint. Ms.
Greenbaum's paper analyzes the prospects of Satellite Business
Systems, (SBS), of which Comsat is one third owner. SBS has moved
from an unsuccessful technology-driven strategy to a market-driven
one, which appears to be more effective. Ms. Greenbaum's paper
presents a scenario where SBS's existing technology can be used
strategically to lead the firm into new markets and services.
This paper focuses on the new direct broadcasting satellite (DBS)
service that Comsat is developing through its Satellite Television
Corporation (STC) subsidiary. STC is another very large, high-risk
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venture in the pattern of SBS. It is based around a new technology
and represents another entry by Comsat into an area where it::
has limited experience and expertise. The issue here is whether
Comsat has learned from its SBS experience, or whether the STC
business will be another technology-based service offered before
the market is ready.
It appears that Comsat has balanced the strategy-technology
interaction in the STC project. It is a new, untested service, yet
substantial market analysis and planning has been performed.
However, the required investment is very large and the payoff is
many years away. It is not clear how the market will react or what
the impact will be to Comsat. Yet, the firm is expecting STC and
DBS to play an important part in its future. These and other issues
are explored below, ending with an evaluation of Comsat's and STC's
prospects.
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Chapter II. The Framework and Comsat
I. Introduction to COMSAT
Comsat is a unique corporation in U.S. corporate history.
Created by a legislative act of Congress in 1962, it is important
to understand why, and the context within which, Comsat was formed,
because the details of its origin still constrain its activities
today. This chapter describes the creation of Comsat and then
devotes one section to each of the five boxes of the research
framework discussed above.
The "space age" began with the successful launching of the
Russian Sputnik in 1957 and the U.S. Explorer in 1958. Space
technology evolved quickly, and it became apparent that satellite
communications would be viable in the near future. The first
communications satellite network proposal was presented by AT&T in
1960. There was tremendous political opposition to the plan, because
it would have increased substantially AT&T's existing monopoly
services. Yet, there was no doubt that satellite communications
would greatly benefit the U.S. Therefore, several alternative plans
were presented advocating network development and operation by the
U.S. government, by the United Nations, or by a new private company.1
This situation was resolved in 1962 when Congress passed the
Satellite Communications Act, which created the Communications
Satellite Corporation (Comsat). The unique aspects of this entity
were that it was to be owned 50% by the common carriers and 50% by
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public investors, the U.S. President was to appoint three members
of the board of directors, and the FCC would monitor its
activities and organizational structure in accordance with the
Satellite Communications Act.
Comsat's mandate from Congress was essentially threefold. First,
the firm was to develop an international satellite communications
network through which the U.S. could communicate efficiently and
effectively with the rest of the world, (more specifically with U.S.
territories and businesses). Second, Comsat was established as the
U.S. monopoly, (the "common carrier's carrier"), to provide a
gateway for AT&T and the international record carriers (IRC's), such
as Western Union, RCA, and IT&T, to interface to the international
satellite network, (which would become INTELSAT). Third, Comsat
had a mandate"...to bring the benefits of satellite communications
to all areas of the world, including emerging nations and developing
areas."2
Comsat was successful in its endeavors, as evidenced by the
successful launching of the Early Bird satellite into geostationary
orbit in 1965. A geostationary orbit is where a satellite rotates
around the Earth at the same speed as the planet turns. This fact
allows the satellite to constantly transmit to the same geographical
region on Earth, which in turn allows much more efficient transmission
and less expensive earth stations. The success of Early Bird
established the commerical viability of satellite communications
networks.
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2. COMSAT Strategy
The discussion of Comsat's strategy must consider that the
corporation is a political entity and is heavily regulated.
Comsat's enterprises, strategies, and organizational structure have
been heavily influenced by the FCC's interpretation of the original
corporate charter and deregulation of the communications industry
in general. Therefore, a part of the strategy discussion must be
concerned with regulatory changes on one hand, and the resultant
evolution of the corporation and businesses on the other.
Comsat's 21 year existence can be broken down into four
strategic phases. Each of these phases is examined in the
following section, with the main emphasis placed on the fourth
and current phase's strategy. In general, the beginning of each
phase is marked by a significant regulatory decision, which has
allowed Comsat to pursue increasingly competitive strategies.
The first phase covers the startup years from 1962 to 1971.
During this time Comsat's "strategy" was to carry out its mandate
to establish an international satellite communications network. When
Comsat succeeded, and established itself as a viable commercial
entity, it sought to broaden its strategic focus. The firm began to
position itself to become the dominant player in the evolving
satellite communications industry, in terms of the development of
new technology and the design and operation of networks.
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However, at this point Comsat was essentially prevented from
being anything but an international "carrier's carrier" by the 1966
FCC Authorized User decision. Indeed, in the late 1960's, when Comsat
tried to expand its international satellite monopoly position to
the U.S. domestic market, it was successfully opposed by the Nixon
administration, AT&T, Western Union and several other corporations.3
In response to this opposition, in 1972 the FCC adopted a policy of
open entry in the domestic satellite area, with some restrictions on
Comsat and the common carriers. This decision removed a portion of
the regulatory barriers that had prevented the expansion of Comsat's
business interests, and the second strategic phase of the firm began.
In order to enter the competitive, (but still regulated), domestic
market, Comsat was required to establish a separate subsidiary. As
a result, Comsat General was created as a wholly-owned subsidiary in
1972. While the parent corporation continued to focus on its
mandated, or "Jurisdictional" business, Comsat General was able to
focus on the newly competitive, and primarily U.S. domestic,
satellite communications market. Its initial competitive strategy
was to use Comsat's existing, unique, technological and operational
expertise to establish itself in this market.
Comsat General's efforts can be classified into three general
areas. First, it directly transferred Comsat's expertise into the
development of large scale satellite networks for the common
carriers and the U.S. government. This effort resulted in the
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Comstar network, leased to AT&T and GTE, and the Marisat network,
leased to the IRC's and used primarily by the U.S. Navy. Second,
Comsat General established a consulting business, providing
advisory services to corporations and governments that were trying to
establish satellite communications networks.
The third effort by Comsat in the competitive area is by far
the most significant. In 1975, the firm proposed the development of
a domestic satellite network to handle the integrated communications
needs of large businesses. Comsat was required by the FCC to form
a joint venture to perform this service. As a result, Satellite
Business Sytems (SBS) was formed with Comsat, IBM, and Aetna Life
& Casualty as equal partners. This venture was Comsat's first
major effort to expand its business to being more than a "carrier's
carrier."
Comsat's third strategic phase began in 1978 and continued
into early 1982. The firm's strategy during this phase can be
summarized as broad-based expansion within the telecommunications
industry. Comsat made an effort to position itself as a high
growth corporation that would lead the high growth satellite
communications industry in all areas. The firm changed from being
involved only in the development of satellite networks to providing
information services, developing software, and manufacturing
communications hardware. During this period Comsat started two
ventures internally, (TeleSystems and STC), and acquired outside
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firms, (ERT, several small firms to form CGIS, and Amplica). These
organizations are described more fully in next section of this
chapter.
Comsat's move was spurred by several simultaneous factors.
First, the FCC ruled that the firm could engage in new business
as long as these efforts were not inconsistent with the purposes
of the basic 1962 charter.4 Second, this ruling was part of a
general trend towards deregulation in the telecommunications
industry and a resultant increase in the growth and competition in
the industry. Third, Comsat realized that the Jurisdictional and
"one-shot" network systems, such as Comstar, had limited growth
potential, and the future lay in the unregulated, competitive
areas. Fourth, the firm was losing good people and technology,
because the organization, legally and culturally, was not set up to
implement innovative product ideas emerging from Comsat Laboratories.
Comsat's fourth (and current) strategic phase is not distinctly
regulatory-related, but represents an effort to regroup and
consolidate following its broad-based expansion during 1978 to 1982.
The firm has recognized that it does not have the resources or
expertise to be a major force in all areas of the satellite
communications industry. This recognition is probably a result of
SBS's difficulties and the failure to growth the small
manufacturing companies as rapidly as was planned. Rather than
moving in several directions at once, Comsat is trying to focus
its efforts.
16.
With this purpose in mind, the firm has developed two planning
models to help it to refine its strategic plans, (see Exhibit II).
Comsat sees the industry as composed of three overlapping areas:
"Transportation", (the conduit or pipeline of satellite networks
through which information flows), "Content", (information services
or programming), and "Hardware", (manufacturing components or
equipment that make up the physical networks). The firm wants to
be involved in all three areas, but only to the extent that the
businesses complement each other. In other words, Comsat wants its
business to be in the overlapping region of all three circles. It
pursues the manufacture of hardware to the extent that it benefits
the other businesses, in terms of cost and delivery of the service
timing considerations. For instance, TeleSystems has developed echo
cancellers, which are important to SBS's telephone service, and
Amplica has developed microwave receiver technology, which is
crucial to the success of STC's service.
Comsat's current strategic thinking recognizes that its
primary businesses, in terms of current or future profits, consist
of the World Systems Division (WSD), SBS, and STC. The manufacturing
efforts are relatively small scale and will provide mainly a
supportive function in key hardware areas. However, there are
several problems with this triad of businesses. First, the
Jurisdictional monopoly business of WSD, which provides over 50%
of Comsat's revenues and over 90% of its profits, is being
deregulated. Basically, this move foreshadows the breakup of
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EXHIBIT II: STRATEGIC PLANNING MODELS
COMMON
CARRIERS
INDIVIDUAL
HOUSEHOLDS
TECHNOLOGIES
CUSTOMERS (A CONTINUUM-LARGE TO SMALL)
PRODUCTS
I1
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Comsat's monopoly and substantial decrease in WSD's revenues over
the next several years. A second problem is that SBS represents a
major commitment of Comsat's resources, yet it is not projected to
earn a profit until 1984. The third problem is the investment and
profitability timeframe of the STC project. This business represents
Comsat's riskiest effort to date. It will require over one half
billion dollars invested by 1986 with no chance to recoup that
investment until roughly 1990.
Comsat's strategy to manage this situation is to try to
sustain its monopoly business and related activities while
concentrating its efforts in the SBS and STC areas. This strategy
is having substantial impact throughout the organization. Each of
the boxes of our framework is affected. The following sections of
this chapter describe some of the issues and trends.
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3. Organization
Comsat's organizational structure has changed significantly
since the 1960's and continues to evolve. In addition, the firm's
culture is undergoing a significant reorientation. This evolution
is a result of Comsat's desire to provide new services in the
competitive area, as well as a result of related regulatory
decisions. The regulatory reasons for structural changes have
originated from a concern that Jurisdictional monopoly revenues
would be used to unfairly subsidize Comsat's efforts in other
business ventures. The following section briefly discusses some
of these issues, as well as describes the major Comsat operating
components, and the most recent organizational structure and
management changes.
As was mentioned in the strategy discussion, Comsat's initial
organizational change occurred in 1972 with the formation of a
separate subsidiary, Comsat General, to handle the new domestic
satellite business. Then, in 1975, Comsat General was the
organizational component through which Comsat became involved with
another competitive business, Satellite Business Systems (SBS).
These ventures were the initial forays of Comsat into the competitive
area, and set the climate for further ventures and corporate
structural change.
The first major organizational changes occurred during the
period from 1978 to early 1982. During this period, Comsat invested
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in several competitive businesses and began to prepare its
organization and management for a new competitive era. A number
of managers from external competitive businesses joined Comsat
during this time. In addition, the firm created a new department,
Corporate Development, to take charge of strategic planning and
coordination of ventures in the competitive area.
Comsat's competitive business investments consisted of both
ventures and acquisitions. The 1981 and 1982 revenues and
operating incomes for these ventures, as well as for the
Jurisdictional business and Comsat General are included in
Exhibit III. The first acquisition was of Environmental Research
and Technology, Inc. (ERT) in 1979. ERT provides environmental
consulting, monitoring, and information services to businesses.
Another investment was the acquisition of a number of small
companies during 1979-1982 to form Comsat General Integrated
Systems (CGIS). This company develops computer software systems
for the integrated circuit CAD/CAM/CAT market. The most recent
acquisition was of Amplica, Inc. in January, 1982. The firm
develops and manufacture microwave amplifiers and other
communications equipment.5
The other business investments were the internal development
of the Comsat General TeleSystems, Inc. and Satellite Television
Corporation (STC) ventures in 1980. TeleSystems was established
to develop and market a telephone communications echo canceller
product. In addition, the firm now produces other products, such
21.
EXHIBIT III: COMSAT'S REVENUES AND OPERATING INCOME
($MM)
OPERATING
REVENUE
OPERATING
INCOME
1981 1982 1981 1982
WSO
COMSAT
GENERAL
TELECOM.
EQUIPMENT*
189.0 250.3
95.8 100.7
12.6 36.0
INFORMATION
SERVICES**
48.5 36.4 (13.7) (22.6)
STC
SBS*** 5.3 39.1 (122.8) (122.0)
TOTAL COMSAT 334.0 409.5 28.3
* TELESYSTEMS AND AMPLICA
** ERT AND CGIS
*** COMSAT'S SHARE IS ONE THIRD OF THESE AMOUNTS
SOURCE: COMSAT ANNUAL REPORT 1982
73.5
28.0
(4.7)
96.1
38.5
(6.6)
43.3
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as shipboard satellite communications terminals. STC, which is the
focus of this paper, plans to provide a pay television service via
direct broadcast satellites.
The major organizational structural change occurred in 1980.
As a result of Congressional and FCC action, Comsat was required
to form a separate organizational unit to include the Jurisdictional
monopoly activities of INTELSAT and INMARSAT. This action also
indicated that Comsat Laboratories should be included with one of
the competitive subsidiaries.7 In response, Comsat created the
new World Systems Division to include all of these activities,
including the Laboratories' research and development work.
The latest Comsat organizational change occurred in September,
1982. This major reorganization was not the result of new ventures,
acquistions, or regulatory requirements. Instead, Comsat made an
effort to restructure itself to give proper emphasis to, and gain
management control over, its competitive businesses. This new
organization structure is shown in Exhibit IV.
The major focus of this change appears to have been to create
a structure that would enhance the corporate management of the
three major Comsat businesses: WSD, STC, and the competitive
business group led in importance by SBS. The first two businesses
are headed by division presidents, while a new Executive Vice
President position has been created to head the competitive business
group. Another result of the reorganization is the establishment
of the Technical Products Group to coordinate the management of
23.
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the manufacturing businesses of TeleSystems and Amplica. A third
attribute of the reorganization is the streamlining of management
ranks at Comsat. That is, two thirds of management personnel are
either involved in overall corporate or competitive business
management. Jurisdictional management numbers have dwindled to one
third of the total.8
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4, Technology
Technology at Comsat includes I/S technologies used for internal
business or development purposes and the I/S technologies of the firm's
products and services. As was noted in the introductory chapter of
this paper, the most interesting technologies at Comsat appear to be
in the latter area. However, a brief discussion of the internal I/S
uses is presented below so that future research projects have an infor-
mation base from which to work. These uses appear to be purely support
in nature and do not interact with strategy at this time.
The first example of internal I/S technology is in the use of
computer-aided design (CAD) systems for VLSI component design at Comsat
Laboratories. The CAD systems have been purchased from external ven-
dors, as well as from CGIS. The second example is the use of standard
computerized applications for the financial and control areas. Ap-
parently, these applications are not very effective, and a new I/S
Department is being created to improve this and other I/S use at Comsat.
The third case of internal I/S technology is found at the World
Systems Division. This division has recently developed three applica-
tions to aid its management operations. First, an interactive communi-
cation system has been developed to handle data management between
remote earth station facilities and WSD headquarters. Second, a
computerized order entry system has been developed to manage the
record-keeping and billing of satellite communication circuits.
Third, a network control system is under development to allow WSD
headquarters to monitor remote earth station equipment.
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The technologies of Comsat's products and services branch into all
areas of the satellite communications industry. Perhaps the best way
to view the diverse Comsat technologies is through Comsat Laboratories,
which is responsible for improving existing technologies and developing
new ones. The Labs are divided into seven distinct technical groups:9
1) Spacecraft Laboratory: It is involved with research and develop-
ment (R & D) relating to spacecraft devices and components that
support the communications subsystem.
2) Microwave Laboratory: It is involved with R & D for components,
equipment, and systems employing microwave technology.
3) Communications Processing Laboratory: It conducts R & D of sig-
nal processing capabilities for satellite communications.
4) Transmission Systems Laboratory: It investigates overall trans-
mision performance in complete satellite systems.
5) Applied Sciences Laboratory: It conducts R & D of materials,
components, and devices that form the physical base of a satellite
system.
6) Optical communications Laboratory: It conducts R & D of optical
communications technology in systems and components.
7) Reliability and Standards Laboratory: It investigates and evalu-
ates the life and reliability of critical devices.
From this overview it is apparent that Comsat is at the leading edge
of all technologies involved in new satellite systems development.
The Laboratories have a major impact on the products and services
offered by the Comsat operating units. One major function of the
Laboratories is to support existing business by developing methods to
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improve the products and services currently offered. For example, this
might include better or faster transmission, more reliable systems, or
utilizing new frequency bands.
The second major role of the Laboratories is to develop new tech-
nological capabilities that will enable the operating units to achieve
their strategic goals. These goals may require that a new technology,
(or an extension of an existing one), be developed. An example here
is the development of a low cost receiver for STC, so the DBS service
concept can become a reality.
Funds used for technology development at the Laboratories fall
into two categories. First, one third to one half of the funding is
used for pure research and development with the purpose of achieving
new breakthroughs in satellite communications technology. The re-
maining funds are used to support the development of specifically-
requested technologies or processes that are essential to the operating
units' strategies.
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5. Individuals/Roles
From this author's limited perspective, it appears that there
are currently three key individuals and roles at Comsat. These are
Comsat President Joseph V. Charyk, Comsat Executive Vice President
Irving Goldstein, and STC President Richard S. Bodman. As the
strategic positioning of Comsat has changed over the past few
years, so have the positions and responsibilities of these men.
In fact their roles are still changing.
Dr. Charyk has been President and CEO of Comsat since its
formation and has provided the politically-savy, scientific
leadership that the firm has needed in its pre-competitive era.
In all likelihood, he will become Chairman of the Board in the next
few months. Mr. Goldstein has been with Comsat for many years,
originally within the Jurisdictional business and then as President
of STC. Since last September, he has filled the newly created
position of Executive Vice President, in charge of all the
competitive business, except STC, and responsible for the SBS
liaison. Mr. Goldstein is heir apparent to Dr. Charyk and should
bring a broader array of business skills to the presidency of Comsat.
Mr. Bodman joined Comsat in 1978 as Vice President of finance and
Corporate Development. He was largely responsible for Comsat's
expansion into several competitive businesses and was promoted to
President of Comsat General, in charge of these businesses. In
September, 1982 he was promoted to President of STC to bring his
substantial portfolio of business skills and operating experience
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into the high potential STC business.
The movement of these three individuals is largely a result
of Comsat's pursuit of a more competitive line of businesses. The
promotions of Mr. Goldstein and Mr. Bodman is an effort to change
to a management group more skilled in operating competitive
businesses. It is not clear who will fill the Executive V.P.
position, which will be vacated by Mr. Goldstein, or even if that
position will remain intact. Additional organizational and role
changes are very likely.
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6. Management Processes
Comsat appears to have a very decentralized management control
system. From the organization chart in Exhibit IV, one can see that
the firm is pursuing a number of different ventures, and these
businesses have yet to be tied together effectively through a
management system. The WSD and STC efforts are closely tied to
corporate management, but this is due to cultural and location
reasons. The other operating units are located away from
Washington, D.C. and tend to function as totally separate companies.
The reorganization in September, 1982 has been one of a series
of efforts to integrate the parts of Comsat and improve overall
management control. These efforts are directed primarily through
the Corporate Development staff and are aimed at establishing
linkages between the operating units and corporate management. One
method currently being used to encourage closer ties is the use of
staff members to assist operating managers in specific problems
areas. A second "linking" mechanism is the development of a
strategic planning system that ties directly into the budgeting
system. This arrangement should improve the communication and
measurement of planning, progress, and management. A third
mechanism is the establishment of a new Information Services group
to improve the quality and timeliness of internal management reports
and information flows. All three of these efforts are relatively
new and will require time before an impact is measurable.
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7. Integration of the Framework Boxes
When one integrates the boxes of the framework described in
the sections above, and considers the nature of the external
environment, an interesting picture develops for Comsat. It is
evident that the firm's orientation and strategy have been heavily
technology-based in the past. Yet, it is also apparent that
deregulation, and therefore market forces, are changing Comsat
and are playing an increasing role in determining the strategic
direction of the firm.
Deregulation of Comsatj and of the communications industry
in general, is presenting strategic opportunities to the firm, in
terms of entering the manufacturing business, information services
business, and competitive satellite communications business.
However, this same deregulation presents a serious threat to Comsat,
as entry barriers to its "exclusive" business terrain fall, and
powerful competitors appear.
The picture that emerges is one of a corporation in transition.
That is, Comsat is trying to gear up across the board to meet the
challenge of a more competitive environment. The firm is revamping
its organization toward the competitive side of the business. It
is pursuing new strategic directions, changing the roles of key
individuals, and improving its management processes. The obvious
question is: "Will these efforts be able tchange Comsat from a
sluggish, regulated monopoly to a thriving competitive corporation
that can make its high risk strategy succeed?"
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Comsat faces three strategic problems in trying to accomplish
this transformation. First, the firm may lose its focus and strength
by pursuing too many opportunities at the same time. In addition,
some of these ventures are so large, (e.g. SBS and STC), as to divert
resources from other areas with a resultant increase in overall
risk to the firm. Second, Comsat has the difficult task of
restraining a technology-based orientation with a more market-driven
outlook. Indeed, fantastic technological ventures that succeed
in a highly regulated environment may not meet the same success
where competition exists and a firm is not insulated from the
effects of its mistakes. Third, Comsat has very limited experience
in competitive operational management, and this fact may hinder
rapid success in its new ventures.
These problems are evident in Comsat's experience with some
of its ventures. For instance, the efforts in the manufacturing
area with the development of CGIS and TeleSystems have moved more
slowly than planned, perhaps due to management's distraction with
the larger World Systems Division, STC, and SBS efforts. In
addition, the SBS business has been forced to change its strategy
totally, because it was based on advanced technology as opposed to
what the market could use, (see Ms. Greenbaum's paper). As a
result, these newer businesses are currently in a net loss
position, which is not expected to change for at least another year.
The rest of the paper focuses on Comsat's efforts with its
newest business and advanced technology, that of direct broadcast
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satellites. Satellite Television Corporation (STC) represents
another Comsat strategic thrust and high risk venture, this time
into the information services area. The STC venture with DBS
presents a specific case of strategy-technology interaction, as
well as an interesting case for strategic analysis. The questions
here are: "Is STC based on another advanced technology without
a market?", and "Can Comsat, (through STC), succeed in the
very competitive pay television market?", and finally, "What
implications does this analysis have for Comsat as a whole?".
These issues are examined in the next three chapters.
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Chapter III. The Framework and STC
1. Introduction to STC
Satellite Television Corporation (STC) is the result of a
proposal from Comsat's Corporate Development staff to its top
management in 1979. The proposal called for Comsat to enter the
consumer pay television market via a direct broadcasting satellite (DBS)
service. This service would transmit television signals directly
to consumers' homes, rather than being relayed by local cable or
terrestrial broadcast system operators. Although the concept of
DBS had existed for several years, the technology had just recently
advanced to a stage where the venture might be feasible in the near
future. In addition, the success of Home Box Office (HBO) in
distributing television programming via satellites to cable TV
operators indicated the service might have substantial market value.
As a result, in May, 1980 Comsat established STC as its wholly-
owned subsidiary to enter the DBS business.
STC essentially created a new industry when it filed its DBS
license application with the FCC in December, 1980. During the next
year there was considerable debate among the television networks
and other communications corporations concerning the viability and
desirability of DBS, as well as STC's (Comsat's) appropriateness as
a system operator. During this time period, eight other firms filed
DBS license applications with the FCC, (see Exhibit V). In June,
1982 the FCC gave its preliminary approval to the DBS concept. In
September, 1982 the FCC officially approved DBS and gave STC
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permission to initiate DBS satellite construction. This ruling
was soon followed by approval of seven of the eight other DBS
applications. In October, 1982 STC made the first major commitment
to the DBS industry by signing a $113 million DBS satellite
construction contract with RCA Astro-Electronics Corp. Thus, the
DBS industry has moved from the planning stage to the implementation
stage, and the competitive race is now beginning.
The next three sections provide, respectively, a discussion of the
DBS concept, technology, and economics, an outline of STC's service
and strategy in this industry, and a description of STC's
organization and key individuals roles. Then, an integrated
picture of STC is presented with some general observations on
strategy-technology interaction at the firm. The next chapter
provides an analysis of STC's strategic positioning within the
external environment of the DBS and pay television industries.
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2. DBS Concept, Technology, and Economics
The concept of a DBS service is not well-defined. In fact,
the nine separate DBS license applications describe substantially
different services. This issue is examined in more detail in the
next chapter. For our purposes, a DBS service is defined as a
network of one or more satellites that can transmit signals over
a large geographical area with sufficient power to be received by a
small earth station or receiver, (roughly one meter in diameter).
Therefore, DBS services provide a mechanism for transmitting signals,
(television programming or information), directly to the consumer
market, or to other individual users, effectively bypassing
terrestrial TV broadcast stations or cable TV operators; hence the
name Direct Broadcasting Satellites. A schematic of a typical DBS
residential installation is attached in Exhibit VI. Also included
in Exhibit VI is a brief comparison of the technical specifications
of existing satellites versus direct broadcast satellites.
DBS technology does not differ tremendously from that of other
satellites, except for the fact that direct broadcast satellites
are larger and can generate a much higher power signal. Typically,
these satellites will have significantly fewer transponders so the
number of channels will be fewer. In addition, DBS transmission
will occur in the 18/12 GHZ frequency band, which is less
susceptible to interference from other transmissions. It is
primarily the high signal power that permits the small receiving
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EXHIBIT VI
TYPICAL RESIDENTIAL INSTALLATION
SOURCE: STC BROCHURE - SATELLITE-TO-HOME
PAY TELEVISION
COMPARISON OF RCA ADVANCED SATCOM
(SATCOMS V AND VI) AND THE
PROPOSED RCA HIGH-POWER DBS SATELLITE
ADVANCED
SATCOM
DBS
SATELLITE
ARRAY SPAN (TIP-TO-TIP)
WEIGHT (IN ORBIT)
ARRAY POWER (END-OF-LIFE)
TOTAL TRANSPONDER POWER
NO. OF TRANSPONDERS
POWER OF EACH TRANSPONDER
EIRP (PER CHANNEL)
39
996
1050
204
ft.
lb.
watts
watts
24
8.5 watts
34 dBW
75 ft.
1952 lb.
3600 watts
1380 watts
6
230 watts
58 dBW
SOURCE: JOHN P. TAYLOR "DBS SERVICE STILL LONG WAY OFF DESPITE FCC
PERMITS," TELEVISION/RADIO AGE, OCTOBER 18, 1982 p. 37
TV set
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antenna to be used, and this small antenna makes the service
concept viable.
There are two other ways that the results of high power DBS
can be approximated. First, instead of launching bigger satellites,
the "footprint", (the geographical area where the satellite signal
is received), can be reduced for existing satellites. The result
is a focused, or "spot" beam, which achieves a stronger signal within
a smaller, defined area. The second alternative method involves the
use of improved receiving antenna technology. This improvement
allows existing lower power satellites to achieve a DBS effect, if
a slightly larger receiving "dish", (1-2 meters in diameter), is
used. Each of these alternative methods achieves results similar
to DBS, but with limitations. The first is limited in geographical
area covered, while the second is limited by the expense and
operational problems of the larger receivers. These issues are
treated in more detail in the following chapter on strategic
analysis.
Other aspects of the DBS technology include signal "scrambling",
so that the signal cannot be "pirated" simply by purchasing the
home receiving equipment and avoiding the programming subscription
charge. In addition, "addressability" of the signal to each
subscriber allows pay-per-view functionality. The addressability
also allows the system operator to send electronic bills and
disconnect notices to subscribers.
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The desirability of DBS to distribute pay television programming
stems from a number of factors. First, many consumers are willing
to pay for the pleasure of watching television. This fact is clear
from the increasing number of television households that subscribe
to cable television services, (roughly 34% or 29 million households
currently).l 1981 statistics from the National Cable Television
Association show that 54.1% of the homes passed by cable television
become subscribers.2 Also, a 1973 study by the Brookings Institution
established that consumers would spend in excess of 5% of their
income for 3 channels of network television if the other option was
to receive no television.3
The second factor is that there are many millions of U.S. house-
holds that do not receive a satisfactory range of television
programming. A 1982 Nielson Report on Television estimates that
there are approximately 11 million households that receive 3 or
fewer television channels.4 In addition, the National Tele-
communication and Information Administration has estimated recently
that over 4.6 million households receive fewer than 3 channels,
while 1.2 million households receive no signal at all. The
majority of these households are in rural areas, remote from
broadcast facilities, or in high density urban areas where
interference is a problem.5
A third factor is that in addition to these 11 million
households, there are another 5-20 million households that will
not be passed by cable in 1986, when the first high power DBS service
should begin. Therefore, there is a total potential market for DBS
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of 15-30 million households, which are in locations where network
broadcast services are not satisfactory and where cable is unlikely
to be immediately installed, either because of regulatory problems
or prohibitive costs.6 In addition to these households, there
would also be a market for DBS service among local television
system operators, community housing, and businesses who have
information needs.
Using a 20-30% potential penetration rate, (the STV penetration
rate), the actual DBS market shrinks to between 3 to 9 million
households.7 At an estimated monthly charge of $25/household, the
total DBS market is between $900 million and $2.7 billion annually.
It is these numbers that are attracting all the attention to DBS.
An interesting aspect of DBS is that once the satellites are in
orbit and operating, there are very low marginal costs involved in
adding new subscribers. Once the breakeven number of subscribers
is reached, (roughly 2 million?), the unit cost of the service
decreases as fixed costs are spread over an increasing subscriber
base. After the breakeven point is reached, the result is a
very profitable business. At the customer end, the cost of home
equipment will probably start off around $400-500. Again, as the
subscriber base and equipment units increase, the cost for this
equipment should drop to the $200-300 range.8
However, while the market is very attractive, it is nt
unlimited, and there are huge risks to entering the business. A
nationwide DBS services is estimated to cost anywhere from $500
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million to $1 billion to establish.9 A commitment of this size
is fine if a firm is the only one in the market, and the timing
of market entry is assured. However, the fact that the first
DBS service could easily be delayed until after 1986, and that a
number of potential operators are fighting for the market, which
is shrinking as each day passes due to the growth of alternative
services, create tremendous uncertainty about the chances of
success for any one operator.
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3. STC Service and Strategy
STC has proposed a DBS service to begin in 1986 that will have
three channels of premium pay television with no advertising.
The service will operate initially in the Eastern time zone with
one satellite. Eventually, it will expand to provide nationwide
coverage via a network of four satellites. The transmitting earth
station facility will be located near Las Vegas, Nevada. It will
transmit signals to each of the four satellites, one for each of
the U.S. time zones. In addition there will be two "in-orbit"
spare satellites. The signals will be received via a .7 meter
antenna, which can easily be installed on anyone's roof for a
one-time charge of $100. The home equipment will be leased at
roughly $10/month and the programming subscription will be roughly
$15/month, for a total consumer cost of $25/month.1 0 Total costs
of the Eastern time zone service through one year of operation are
estimated at $683 million, while the national service is estimated
to cost $1 billion. 1 1
The primary channel, "Superstar",...will operate 24-hours-a-day
with a mix of major motion pictures, popular concerts, theatre
specials, and family entertainment. This is the channel that will
typically appeal to the greatest number of subscribers."1 2 The
other two channels, "Spectrum" and "Viewer's Choice" will
operator for roughly fifteen hours each day. These two channels
will offer a wide range of programming including cultural
and educational programs. STC's service will also feature
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pay-per-view events, such as major sports events or film
releases. Another feature will be the offering of teletext,
stero sound, and a second language audio track. It will also be
able to offer special interest programs, or "narrowcasting",
because it can bring geographically separated viewers into one
larger audience. The subscription revenues from these groups will
be sufficient to support special programs. In addition, STC intends
to be able to experiment with high definition television.13
STC's strategy appears to have changed very little since its DBS
plan was conceived in 1980. The following interpretation has
been drawn from the firm's published description of its service
and strategy, from the general comments of many industry observers,
and from the current activities of STC as reported by trade journals.
An initial comment is that the strategy is clearly rooted in
technology, because STC has made a very basic technical decision
that high power satellites are the only way to offer a DBS service.
An overall statement of STC's strategy is that the firm intends
to be the DBS industry leader in terms of service definition,
technological innovation, market entry and share,and quality
service. However, the firm's strategy is multi-faceted, and the
following paragraphs discuss the different aspects of it in more
detail.
The first element of STC's strategy is to be the first DBS
system in operation. Since there is a limited market, early
entry is crucial, because the first firm should be able to control
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the largest and most profitable market share. In addition,
STC believes that the first-in position will give it a sufficient
headstart to deter others firms from even entering the market,
because of the extremely large fixed costs required.
The second element of strategy revolves around an incremental
approach to entry in this market. Originally, STC had planned to
have a limited SMATV service in operation during early 1983. These
plans were cancelled for technical and financial reasons. Now, STC
plans to offer a preliminary DBS service to a very limited
geographical area in 1984-85.14 This move will test aspects of
the technology and should establish STC and DBS as a viable service
in the minds of consumers. In addition, it will allow STC to gain
necessary operational experience in all aspects of this business.
The second phase of the entry strategy is to begin full-fledged
DBS service with one active satellite and one spare in the Eastern
Time Zone in 1986. According to STC, approximately one half of the
potential DBS customer base is in this geographical region.1 5 STC
will be able to evaluate the service at this point over the next
several years.
A third element of the STC strategy is found in the firm's market
definition. Whereas some of the other potential DBS operators plan
to provide service to exisiting TV system operators, STC plans to
focus on the consumer market. STC is targetting its service to
the 15-30 million TV households that are projected to be unpassed
by cable in 1986. These customers are split fairly evenly between
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the rural market and high-density urban areas. As a secondary market
target, STC will also provide services to commercial customers,
residential groups, and system operators.1 6
A fourth element of STC's strategy concerns the firm's search
for a partner in this DBS venture. STC is willing to pursue the
venture alone, but it feels the service might have to be redefined
if only Comsat is involved. The primary advantage of a partner is
the reduced financial burden, and therefore, risk, to Comsat and
STC. In addition, STC is looking for expertise in the retail
services area, and perhaps in the programming area as well.1 7
The area of programming presents a fifth element of STC's
strategy. Originally, the service was to provide "premium"
programming for the initial stages of the venture. Once the
service is operating, STC plans to invest in programming ventures,
probably with partners, to provide special interest programming,
as well as to assure itself access to sufficient quantities of
high quality programming. In addition, the firm plans to provide
pay-per-view special events through its service.1 8
A sixth area of strategy for STC involves the efforts to make
certain that low cost DBS receiving antennas are available for
consumer purchase by 1986. These efforts include Comsat's
acquisition of Amplica in 1982, so it can influence the development
and production of microwave amplifier technology.1 9 Also, Comsat
has released specifications for the small DBS antenna to several
electronic equipment manufacturers to stimulate prototypes and
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manufacturing bids. In particular, a joint effort by NEC and
Alcoa looks very promising.2 0
A seventh element of STC's strategy has been to design its DBS
satellites with as much flexibility as possible. The purpose here
is two-fold. First, there probably will be changes in technical
DBS definition over the next year. STC wants its satellites to be
able to broadcast in various frequencies and to handle other
possible variations. Second, as technology advances over the next
three years before the DBS service is scheduled to commence, STC
wants to be able to benefit from these improvements, which may permit
more channels, fewer satellites, and smaller, less costly receivers.
Another strategic area for STC concerns the waging of a general
public relations campaign for DBS. This campaign is targeted at the
FCC, consumers, special interest groups, and other system operators.
STC and Comsat are doing everything in their power to prevent the
DBS image from tarnishing and to prevent the FCC from changing its
DBS ruling. For instance, STC has offered to establish a MESBIC,
(Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Corporation), to fund
programming efforts for minorities. Also, STC has offered to
contribute to a fund to compensate microwave radio operators who
will have to leave the portion of the frequency spectrum to be used
by the new DBS services.21
The last strategic element of STC's service to be mentioned
here concerns financing. STC has $225 million of equity funding
from COMSAT, which has been approved by the FCC. In addition, STC
has established a $400 million line of credit through the Chase
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Manhatten Bank. Additional long term debt financing is scheduled
for 1983-85.22 Clearly, STC will be a heavily leveraged operation,
and it will operate at a loss for at least a few years. However,
these finances have been arranged on a non-recoure basis, so
Comsat, the parent company, is protected to some extent should the
DBS venture experience difficulties.
In summary, this interpretation shows STC's strategy as a well-
developed series of steps to create a new industry. Because the
industry is regulated, the basic elements of STC's strategic plan
and service description are available for public review. Comsat
and STC appear to believe that their headstart in pursuing DBS,
in addition to their technical and operational satellite expertise,
will enable STC to be the industry leader and first market entrant.
Despite the risks of being first, the firms believe this factor is
the key one to being the dominant industry player. However, it
remains to be seen whether or not this plan can be successfully
implemented. In the next chapter this plan is analyzed against
the external environment and STC's strengths and weaknesses.
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4. STC Organization and Individuals
The STC organization is still in the early stages of development.
Currently, the firm employs roughly 80-100 people, but there are
several departments that are just beginning to be staffed. Prior
to the September, 1982 FCC approval of STC's license application,
there was no need for the firm to have all organizational functions
filled. Until that decision, STC's personnnel consisted primarily
of engineers, supplemented by legal staff, planners, and public
relations people. This personnel composition certainly reflected
the preliminary nature of the venture, but more importantly, it
reflected the startup of a technology-based venture in a highly
regulated environment.
Since the September FCC decision, STC has been free to implement
its plans, and the firm has begun to increase the staff in the
implementation-oriented parts of the organization. The current
organization chart is displayed in Exhibit VII. The chart shows
that three very important departments: Operations, Marketing, and
Programming have yet to be organized totally. These functions are
essential to a home entertainment service, such as STC's DBS, and
the firm is actively hiring in these areas. It should not be
construed that STC is late in filling these slots. The service is
still three years away from operation and there is plenty of time
for the people in these functions to organize and do their jobs well.
Another characteristic of the organization that stands out from
the chart is that the staff functions report directly to the STC
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President, (Mr. Bodman), while the operation aspects of the
service report directly to the Executive Vice President, (Mr.
Alpert). Mr. Alpert appears to act essentially as an unofficial
chief operating officer. These two men probably perform the key
individual roles at STC. They were both involved in the initial
conception of DBS at Comsat. Mr. Bodman and Mr. Alpert assumed
their current positions with STC in September, 1982 after the FCC
authorization of the DBS service. As previously mentioned, Mr.
Bodman replaced Mr. Goldstein, who left STC to perform other
duties for Comsat. Mr. Bodman and Mr. Alpert have joined STC to
manage the "implementation" stage of the venture.
STC appears to have very close ties to the parent corporation
at this point, despite being located in another part of Washington,
D.C. This fact is not really surprising considering that STC is
expected to play such an important part in Comsat's future. In
addition, STC represents a very risky and very large financial
commitment for Comsat, and it is only reasonable that the parent
firm be interested in its progress. However, there seems to be
tremendous, non-financial corporate commitment at Comsat and STC
to make the DBS venture successful.
The interaction between STC and Comsat occurs on several levels.
Most of the formal interaction takes place through Mr. Bodman, but
there appears to be informal interaction at all levels of the
organization. Particularly, STC's legal and financial people obtain
assistance from the same, but much larger, parts of the parent
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company's organization. In addition, there is an informal consulting
role played by Comsat Laboratories to STC's engineering group.
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5. STC Summary
A summary of the various aspects of STC presents a corporation
that is still in its early stages of formation, yet appears to have
a very definite sense of purpose. Without considering the external
environment in detail, several statements can be made about STC.
In terms of the "boxes" of the research framework, STC's strategy
is well-developed and gives the firm a carefully designed plan to
follow. Technology at STC means DBS, and the firm's strategy is
based around the DBS technology. However, the strategy is not
controlled by the technology. In fact, market forces, such as
alternative pay television delivery methods, and legal/regulatory
issues, such as orbital slot assignments, have more impact on the
strategy.
STC strategy and DBS technology are certainly tightly intertwined
and there is on-going interaction. For instance, improved receiver
technology may require less powerful transmissions. A direct
result may be a lower cost service, because fewer satellites are
necessary or more channels can be offered. In addition, this
improved receiver technology may mean lower cost receivers and
therefore a more rapid market acceptance. However, it appears
that these improvements are occurring within the defined strategy.
That is, as noted earlier, Comsat's acquisition of Amplica and other
related activities were intended to stimulate these technological
improvements. Therefore, in terms of the original research proposi-
tion, strategy appears to be controlling technology and not vice-versa.
54.
In other areas of the framework, the organization is
being built up in accordance with the strategy. As programming
and marketing needs become more imminent, people are being hired for
those functions. In addition, as STC has moved into the implementation
stage, specific lead roles have been defined and filled with
specifically qualified individuals, (i.e. Mr. Bodman and Mr.
Alpert). Finally, a tremendous commitment in the corporate
culture appears to have developed toward DBS, which effectively
feeds back to support the strategy and progress of the venture.
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Chapter IV. External Environment - Threats and Opportunities
I. Introduction
The external environment has been changing rapidly since STC
first proposed a DBS service in 1980, and the environment is far
from hospitable. Legal and regulatory issues, technological
advancement, substitute methods of pay TV delivery, and DBS
competitors have combined to present an entirely new situation
to STC and Comsat in 1983 and beyond. These issues really boil
down to a question of timing. FCC regulatory procedures have
already delayed STC for two years. Additional delays will cause
the potential DBS market to shrink further as alternative delivery
methods make increasing inroads. In addition, delays will allow DBS
competitors to reduce STC's technological competitive advantage.
The net result is increasing uncertainty and risk for Comsat and STC.
On the other hand, if STC is successful in establishing itself
as the premier DBS service, the opportunities for Comsat are
substantial. In its FCC DBS application, STC projects 600
thousand subscribers by 1987.1 Estimating that a breakeven
subscriber base is around two million and assuming a compounded
annual growth rate of 30%, (roughly the STV and cable TV growth
rates), STC's DBS service should break-even sometime during 1991
with revenues of $600 million. 2 STC has projected in their
application that DBS services should have a total subscriber base
of between 3 and 7 million.3 Another one million subscribers would
give STC annual revenues of $900 million and a very profitable
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margin. These revenues are more than twice those of all of Comsat's
businesses in 1982. A market of 5 million subscribers equals
revenues of roughly $1.5 billion.
Future scenarios show the possibility for much larger markets.
One scenario sees DBS providing a vehicle for the emergence of
high-definition television (HDTV) in the home. In this view,
consumers subscribe to DBS services to receive HDTV signals, which
they cannot get from the terrestial broadcasters. Eventually, DBS
becomes the dominant method of television broadcasting. Another
scenario shows two-way transmission being initiated through a
second generation of DBS satellites and home equipment attachments.
However, none of these opportunities, no matter how futuristic,
can be realized if the first DBS service is not established. The
following sections look at several threats to the emergence of
DBS and the success of STC.
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2. Legal and Regulatory Issues
One of the major potential barriers to DBS service is presented
by a series of regulatory and legal issues yet to be resolved. Since
the FCC approved the DBS concept and granted licenses to the eight
potential system operators, there have been a number of appeals of
the ruling. In particular, the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB) has led an active struggle against DBS, because many of its
members would be bypassed and potentially forced out of business by
the new satellite service.
The NAB has filed with the FCC to reconsider its ruling and it
has asked the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington for a stay of
STC's DBS license. Both appeals have been rejected. However, the
NAB has initiated two court proceedings against the FCC's approval
of DBS and STC authorization specifically, which are not expected
to be resolved until the end of 1984.4 By that time STC will have
expended or committed a major portion of the estimated $400 million
fixed cost of their DBS system. A ruling against DBS and STC
would expose the corporation and its parent, Comsat, to substantial
losses. It also would probably deter Comsat from continuing with
its DBS plans. However, Comsat and STC do not believe that these
legal efforts to stay DBS and STC will succeed.5
The major regulatory issue facing STC and DBS is that the
satellite construction permits issued by the FCC last fall are
"interim" in nature. This terminology refers to the fact that the
operators have been authorized to build satellites without final
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assignment by the FCC of operating frequencies and orbital slots.
The FCC cannot assign these specific factors until after the June,
1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference, (R.A.R.C.), has
agreed on the regional allocation of frequencies and orbital
slots. This agreement will be an international treaty, therefore
requiring ratification by the U.S. Senate. So it will be some
months after June, 1983 before the FCC can finalize all the
DBS regulations and system operator assignments.6
The danger here is that the final DBS specifications may be
significantly different from those anticipated originally by STC
and the other authorized DBS operators. Therefore, any DBS system
operator that initiates satellite construction before the final
DBS regulations are available, (as STC has done), is taking a
significant risk that the existing satellite design can accomodate
any necessary changes. Discussions with STC officials have
indicated that STC does not expect significant problems to emerge
from the R.A.R.C. In addition, STC satellite design is sufficiently
flexible to handle different frequency and orbital slot assignments.
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3. Technological
Another potentially dangerous issue for STC concerns the area
of technology. The issues here are two-fold. First, as is shown
in Exhibit VI, DBS satellites are a different breed of satellite than
has ever been constructed. These satellites are twice as large as
existing satellites, much more powerful, and more complex in a
number of areas. It is very likely that new engineering problems
will develop during the construction phase. The construction
contract between STC and RCA Astro-Electronics Corp. specifies that
the satellites will be ready for launch three years after the start
of the contract in October, 1982. STC says that lags have been
built into the contract to handle any unforseen problems. However,
problems may develop that delay the construction schedule, which
will delay the start of STC's DBS service.
The second technological issue concerns the advancing state of
the art in the technology of higher frequency communications. Recent
comments by Dr. Bernard Jacobs and Satcom, Inc. indicate that
improvements in the reception of 18/12 GHZ transmissions may allow
the use of one half the broadcast power proposed by STC and other
DBS operators. The use of 100-watt transponders would double the
number of available transponers and cut the cost per channel in
half. This fact may pose a significant problem to STC if its
competitors can provide a lower cost service after STC is committed
to its earlier, higher cost per channel, 200-watt satellites.7
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4. Medium Power DBS
Another threat to the high power DBS services is the advent of
so-called "medium power" DBS. As was mentioned in the Technology
section of the previous chapter, recent advances in receiving
technology will permit an alternative method of delivering direct
broadcast services using lower power signals and slightly larger
antennas, (1-2 meters in diameter). This class of service is
scheduled to commence in late 1983, using a new generation of
satellites in the 15-50 watt per transponder range. The signals
will be broadcast over frequency bands that have already been
allocated, and are therefore not subject to the current R.A.R.C.
and FCC DBS regulation process.
The primary proponent of this medium power service is United
Satellite Communications, Inc., (formerly United Satellite
Television Corp.), which is a joint venture between General
Instruments Corp., Prudential Insurance Co., and a private New
York investor. USCI is advocating a full-blown direct-to-home
broadcast service in direct competition with the proposed high
power DBS services. Three other companies: STC, Focus
Broadcasting Co., and Oak Communications Inc., are also interested
in this service concept. STC is interested in setting up a
preliminary DBS service in a limited geographical area in order
to test equipment and work out operational problems prior to
offering its high power service. Focus Broadcasting plans to
offer a service very similar to the USCI one described below.
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Oak Communications has cancelled its proposal for a variety of
reasons, one of which is a concern that medium power signals and
1.2 meter dishes would not generate a picture of acceptable quality.8
The USCI proposal offers a potentially crippling blow to high
power DBS, if it reaches the operational stage and works. This
service is scheduled to begin during the fall of 1983 and projects
3-4 million customers over the next 5 years. The service description
is essentially the same as STC's, except it will use 1.2 meter dishes
that will cost $100-200 more. Because the USCI service plans to
buy transponders on existing satellites, rather than develop and
launch its own satellites, the cost will be -substantially lower than
those of the high power DBS services. In addition, it will have a
large time advantage, because it is scheduled to begin operations
three years ahead of high power DBS.9
However, there are several reasons to believe that medium power
service does not present a direct threat to high power DBS services
such as STC. First, there are a number of legal actions being
pursued against USCI. The basic contention of these filings is
that, first, USCI escaped proper review by the FCC because it
proposed to use non-DBS portions of the frequency spectrum.1 0 The
second contention is that USCI's service is not in the long term
best interests of its customers. Because it is using "non-DBS"
satellites, when high power DBS services commence, USCI's customers
will not have the proper receiving equipment to take advantage
of these additional services.l
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The second case against USCI's success is that the residential
market for the service will be too limited, both geographically
and economically. First, the satellites that USCI proposes to
use have been designed to provide different services. Therefore,
operational modifications, such as tilting the satellites in
orbit, will have to be performed in order to provide the signal
"footprint" needed by USCI. However, the footprint will only
cover the northern half of the U.S1 2 The economic limitation of
the market is simply the result of higher cost earth station. This
argument follows the simply logic that fewer people will buy a
$500 dish than a $300 dish.
The third case against USCI concerns three operational problems
of using 1.2 meter dishes and medium power signals. These problems
are part of the reason that STC postponed its own original interim
service. First, it requies two installation technicians to physically
install the larger dishes. This fact doubles the initial installation
cost. Second, the 1.2 meter dish is sufficiently large that it
cannot be attached securely enough to standard residential homes'
roofs to withstand brisk winds. In other words, there are
potentially substantial damage and liability costs involved. Third,
the 1.2 meter dish has a very small aiming tolerance, because of
the lower power signal. Therefore, events such as poor installation,
wind storms, house settling, and satellite drift will cause poor
reception and a costly service visit.l3
To summarize, the potential of the USCI service to damage the
interests of the high power DBS services in the residential market
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seems to be mitigated by a number of factors. However, this
"quasi-DBS" service may be successful in the SMATV Market. In
addition, as the technology advances, the USCI service could pose
a more serious threat in other markets. The effect of a successful,
small-scale USCI home service or SMATV service could provide a
good public relations boost for high power DBS. Of course, a poor
USCI service could just as easily damage the image of DBS and
make it that much harder for the high power DBS services to
penetrate the market in 1986.
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5. Alternative Delivery Methods
One of the most serious questions facing STC and the other
authorized high power DBS operators is the question of whether or
not a large profitable market will exist by the time these services
are available in 1986. If DBS is delayed for any reason, this issue
becomes even more significant. The expression that DBS faces
"a closing window" is often heard in this industry. In fact, some
industry experts predict that if DBS is not operating by 1987,
there will not be an opportunity for profitable DBS.14
The reason behind these statements is that cable television
and other television delivery services, such as Subscription
Television (STV), Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS), Satellite
Master Antenna Television (SMATV), and Low Power Television (LPTV),
are signing up subscribers at a rapid rate. Basically, DBS will
get whatever subscriber base is left unsigned in 1986-87. Each of
these television services is discussed briefly below.
By far the most important of these services is cable
television. Cable's primary advantage is its large existing,
installed cable base. Currently, roughly 55-60% of U.S. television
households are passed by cable.1 5 Basically, this removes over
half the television households from DBS's potential market now. In
addition, cable is continuing to be laid at a rapid rate, thereby
leaving 15-30 million households unpassed by the time DBS is
offered in 1986.16 The reason for the 15 million household range
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is that there is evidence that the rate of cable penetration may
decrease due to increasing costs of urban regulatory requirements
and cabling areas less dense in population.
It is expected that DBS will penetrate the cable market for
several reasons. First, cable offers more channels and therefore
a greater variety of programming than DBS. Second, once cable is
installed, customers are not likely to pay disconnect fees and new
installation charges to switch to DBS. Third, cable has greater
potential for two-way monitoring and transaction services.
After cable, STV is probably the next most important of the
alternative services. STV is a one channel system, which operates
in the conventional VHF or UHF bands. Currently, approximately 1.2
million households have subscribed to this service. However, after
a dramatic beginning, STV's growth has greatly declined. A number
of STV operators have failed, and there appears to be general low
profitability because of regulatory requirements.1 7
Another alternative service is MDS, which is a short-range,
omni-directional, microwave transmission system. These systems
typically have a small user base and operate in urban areas. The
current penetration is just under 1 million households.18 MDS
currently operates on a single channel basis. However, there is
agitation to increase the number of channels. Industry analysts
speculate that a multi-channel MDS service would be very successful
and could significantly reduce the market for DBS in urban areas.
SMATV is a very recent service made possible by improvements
in transmission reception technology. Basically, this service is a
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form of DBS using lower frequencies and larger antennas. SMATV has
been very successful in hotels, condominiums, and apartment complexes,
and several hundred thousand households are being serviced currently.1 9
While not competing for the primary DBS residential market, this
service is having a great impact on the secondary DBS market.
The final alternative service is LPTV, which is really just
getting started. LPTV is intended for small scale, local conventional
broadcast use. These systems have potential for both the urban and
rural markets. The wide scale establishment of these systems could
further reduce the potential DBS market.20 However, there have been
regulatory workload problems in granting LPTV licenses, so the market
penetration is minimal at this point.
In addition to cable, these other alternative television
services are shrinking the subscriber market that will be available
to DBS in 1986. In fact, because of these additional services, the
market may be on the low side of the 15-30 million household range.
STC plans on a 20 million household market. It is imperative that
DBS systems become operational as soon as possible, and not beyond
1987. Interim services, such as USCI's medium power and STC's
test service, may slow the market shrinkage by showing consumers
the potential of the future high power DBS service.
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6. Competitors
If STC does succeed in establishing a DBS service, and a
sizeable market still exists, the firm may still have problems in
establishing a profitable service. There are seven other companies
that have received FCC authorization to provide high power DBS
services, (see Exhibit V), and these companies will be vying for
the same pool of subscribers. However, there are wide differences
among these companies as to their DBS plans, their commitment to
the industry, and their relevant business skills. The following
paragraphs briefly discuss these issues, as well as compare Comsat/
STC's competitive advantages/disadvantages versus its DBS competitors.21
CBS has proposed what is probably the most unusual DBS plan.
Following the pattern of STC, CBS has proposed an incremental service,
first broadcasting to the Eastern time zone via one satellite and
one in-orbit spare and then broadcasting nationwide with four
satellites and two in-orbit spares. The service would provide three
channels, but here is where the difference begins. CBS intends to
use all three channels to transmit high-definition television (HDTV)
signals. The first channel will be used to broadcast advertiser-
supported programming to its affiliated TV stations and directly to
consumers outside the broadcasting range of its affiliates. The
second channel will be used to distribute pay television programming
to cable TV system operators and directly to consumers. The third
channel will be used to provide other pay services, such as film
distribution to theaters, and perhaps teletext and close-circuit
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transmissions to businesses and other users. The FCC has approved
CBS's plan conditionally, because CBS did not include costs in its
proposal.
CBS clearly has the financial resources and television
industry expertise to be a formidable competitor in the DBS industry.
However, there is some evidence that CBS is not seriously committed
to its proposal or DBS. Some industry analysts speculate that the
firm was trying to slow the progress toward DBS with its unusual
proposal. In addition, CBS is now the only authorized DBS applicant
to support the NAB's legal filing against the FCC's approval of DBS.
Graphic Scanning has offered a DBS plan aiming initially at
the western half of the U.S. with one satellite and then expanding
nationwide with another active satellite and one in-orbit spare.
The service would provide two channels of pay television and perhaps
other services such as teletext. Graphic Scanning's license was also
granted conditionally, because of questions of misconduct by the firm
in obtaining licenses in other telecommunications areas. The firm has
not made substantial visible movement toward operationalizing its
DBS plans.
Western Union's DBS proposal consists initially of two
satellites broadcasting two channels nationwide. The second phase
would include two more active satellites and two in-orbit spares,
providing a total of four channels. Western Union plans to lease the
channels to programming distributors, but not on a common carrier
basis. The firm has the financial resources and satellite operations
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expertise to provide the DBS service. Yet, it has not proceeded with
a satellite construction contract at this point.
Video Satellite Systems (VSS) has proposed a DBS plan of two
satellites broadcasting one channel of advertiser-supported
programming nationwide to independant terrestial TV broadcasters and
consumers. The fully implemented system will include four active
satellites broadcasting two channels and one on-ground spare. The
programming will be provided by the VSS affiliate, Dominion Satellite
Network. VSS also has not yet initiated satellite construction and
does not appear to have arranged the !financing for the venture.
RCS Americom has proposed a DBS plan with initially one active
satellite broadcasting to the Eastern time zone and two spares. The
system will be expanded to cover the entire country with four active
satellites and two spares. RCA plans to include six channels, some
based on a non-common carrier basis and one or two for its own use.
RCA certainly has the financial, television, and technical expertise
to operate a DBS service. However, the firm has not initiated
satellite construction yet and has indicated that it is still
studying the business viability of the service.
Direct Broadcast Satellite Corp. (DBSC), led by former Comsat
vice president Wilbur Pritchard, has proposed a service using three
satellites and one in-orbit spare to broadcast six channels to each
of three zones. In addition, the service will provide two movable
spot beams with additional channels within each zone. DBSC plans to
lease the channels on a common carrier basis. This firm is tremendously
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interested in DBS and has the satellite operation expertise. However,
it has not lined up the necessary financial backing and has not
initiated satellite construction yet.
United States Satellite Broadcasting Co. Inc. (USSB), a
subsidiary of Hubbard Broadcasting, has proposed a national system
of two satellites and one in-orbit spare broadcasting three channels.
The channels would carry advertiser-supported programming, produced
mainly by USSB and its affiliates, to independent TV broadcasters and
directly to consumers in areas not covered adequately by conventional
broadcasting. USSB also is very serious about DBS and has the
programming and television industry expertise necessary for the service.
In addition, the firm appears to be arranging the necessary financing
through Lehman Brothers. However, USSB has not as yet initiated
satellite construction.
So, how does the STC stack up against its potential high power
DBS competitors? There is clearly no standout competitor at this
point. DBSC and USSB appear to be truly interested in establishing
a DBS service, yet their financing is not established. None of the
seven firms have initiated satellite construction as yet. This fact
could become a major barrier to these firms because the FCC
authorizations expire if satellite construction contracts have not
been arranged by December 31, 1983. On the other hand, particularly
CBS and RCS Americom would become formidable competitors, because of
their size, television industry experience, and communications
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expertise, if they fully commit to the DBS industry.
STC and Comsat appear to compare favorably against the potential
competition. STC's competitive disadvantages are first, that the
firm comes from a regulated environment and has limited competitive
management experience to date. Second, the firm has no television
industry or programming experience. And third, the firm has no retail
business or consumer marketing experience. However, many of these
skills can be gained by hiring the proper people.
On the positive side, STC has a number of competitive advantages.
First and foremost is that the firm has a headstart, because it has
initiated satellite construction and already has explored many issues,
such as home equipment manufacture and broadcast center construction.
STC is simply further along in its plans, perhaps by as much as a
year, than the other competitors. A second advantage is the corporate
commitment at Comsat to the DBS project. Third, STC already has the
financing established to put the Eastern time zone service into
operation. Finally, Comsat and STC have the satellite design,
operational expertise, and technical resources to make the DBS
concept work.
On balance then, STC has to be rated the most like firm to
succeed in establishing a DBS service, because of its headstart and
corporate commitment. With most industry experts predicting only
two or three successful DBS operators at most, the headstart and
resultant first-in position in the market are the key considerations.
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7. Summary
In summary, the DBS marketplace can only be described as
presenting enormous opportunities, but also enormous uncertainty
and risk. The threats are sufficiently significant that partial
realization of any one of them could delay or injure the DBS
concept, STC, or both. The result could easily be a much smaller
market, stronger competitors, and slimmer chances for profitable
DBS.
STC and Comsat have chosen to be the DBS industry leader. The
firm initiated the concept, led the regulatory struggle, and has
committed its reputation and well over $100 million to the venture.
As a result, Comsat, through STC, has the best chance to be the
first DBS service in operation.
However, even this first-in position does not guarantee success.
If STC proves that there is a lucrative DBS market, some of the other
potential DBS operators will certainly follow into the DBS market.
These firms will have the advantage of seeing, and learning from,
STC's mistakes. In addition, firms such as CBS and RCA have the
technical, financial, and television industry resources to make
STC's market lead short-lived. Once in the DBS market, STC will
have to conduct itself well to maintain its lead. Some of these
critical success factors are discussed in the next chapter.
In addition, STC's leadership position places it in a most
exposed position. The firm's competitors appear to be letting it
assume all the risk. Delays or changes would not significantly
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affect them, because they have invested very little at this point.
However, delays or changes would cause Comsat and STC to suffer
tremendous losses, and STC might be knocked out of the running.
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Chapter V. Conclusion and Implications
1. Introduction
This thesis has tried to apply the research proposition of
technology driving strategy to the example of Comsat and STC. In
doing so, we have gained an interesting perspective of the two
firms, and a strategic analysis of STC has been presented. This
concluding chapter has a threefold focus in trying to summarize
some of these issues. First, the results of the thesis proposition
in the context of STC and Comsat are summarized. Second, the basic
issue of the success or failure of STC is discussed briefly. Third,
the implications to Comsat of the STC venture are examined.
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2. Strategy-Technology
The introductory chapter to this thesis has noted that Comsat
is somewhat unusual as a subject of this research project. The
research proposition has primarily been concerned with searching
out and analyzing examples of internal I/S technology leading
companies in new strategic directions. We have determined that
Comsat's significant I/S technologies are found in its products
and services and have tried to incorporate this into the research
analysis. Unfortunately, after studying Comsat and STC, it appears
that this effort has not presented any substantial new information
for the original proposition.
Comsat is certainly a heavily technology-oriented company.
All of its products and services are technology-based, and some of
them, (i.e. STC and DBS), represent new strategic directions for
the firm. However, it cannot really be said that technology is
driving strategy here. Indeed, from our observations of STC, it
appears there is on-going strategy-technology interaction, but the
technology developments occur within a defined strategic context.
From our overall analysis of Comsat, if anything seems to drive
strategy, it would appear to be the deregulatory trend in
telecommunications and the firm's desire to broaden its base into
the competitive business area.
The analytical framework of breaking a firm into a number of
connected "boxes" has proven helpful in obtaining a clearer look at
Comsat and STC. Although this framework did not lead to new
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information for the research proposition, it did help to present
a strategic analysis of STC. The next sections of this chapter
focus on some of the strategic issues of STC and the resultant
implications for Comsat.
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3. Is There a Market for DBS?
The issue of whether or not there is a market for DBS is
appropriate because it is a new technology. New technologies are
often wonderful in what they can do, but basing a business around
one is only an effective strategy if there are enough consumers of
the product/service to make it profitable. Comsat has experienced
this problem once already in its SBS venture. If STC is following
the same pattern, the repercussions will be more serious, because
STC requires a larger investment and is not yet a partnership effort.
However, there does indeed appear to be a market for DBS-type
services, but no one knows whether it will be a two million subscriber
market or a ten million subscriber market. This range is the
difference between one break-even service and three profitable
services. One key determinant of the market size is the timing of
the first DBS service. If STC begins DBS operations in 1986, or
before, it will find a much larger market than if it begins service
a year later. If two years pass, the opportunity for DBS may have
passed before any service could begin. Unfortunately, STC is in
the position of having to commit substantial resources now in order
to enter the market in 1986, but the firm does not know whether
regulatory or other delays will cause its investment to be wasted.
In addition, it is essential to realize that DBS technology is
a distribution vehicle. That is, the market is primarily for
programming, not for DBS technology. If the programming is not as
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good or better than that delivered by other methods, DBS will not
find a ready market, no matter how effective the delivery is.
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4. Success or Failure?
At this point in time, it is impossible to do more than
speculate as to whether or not DBS and STC will succeed. Industry
experts sit on both sides of the fence in the case of DBS. However,
given the success of DBS, STC is given as good, or slightly better,
chance of succeeding as any of the other authorized DBS operators.1
STC has mentioned a number of critical success factors for its
DBS venture. First is that satellite construction must proceed on
schedule so the timing of first-in market entry in 1986 will not be
delayed. To this end, STC has established a substantial research and
development budget with Comsat Laboratories. A second factor is the
setup of a marketing, distribution, and service infrastructure for
the consumer contact, (home equipment and subscriptions), portion of
the service. A third critical factor is to establish a sufficient
supply of low-cost home equipment by 1986. Comsat has taken steps
in this direction with the acquisition of Amplica and the release
of specifications and RFP's to earth station manufacturers. A fourth
factor is to make certain that STC has access to a sufficient supply
of quality programming. The firm is currently employing an
experienced programming consultant to aid them in this process.
A fifth, and general, success factor is to hire good employees,
particularly the managers in the new STC marketing and programming
departments.
It seems that three other factors are also critical to STC's
success. First, the firm's limited-area, test DBS service in
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1984-1985 must take place and must be successful. This factor
will establish the viability of DBS, slow down the growth rate
of other delivery methods, give confidence to Comsat/STC and its
investors, as well as give STC operations experience with DBS
service. The second additional factor is finding a partner to
reduce Comsat's financial commitment and complement its expertise.
This factor would take some of the burden off Comsat and give more
confidence to its investors.
The third additional success factor relates to actions or
behavior that may be necessary of STC if it is to maintain its DBS
market leadership position after establishing a DBS service. That
is, STC must realize that continued success in a new technology-based
marketplace is never guaranteed, particularly where strong
competitors exist. New technology products/service require on-going
innovation to maintain a firm's market position. If STC attains
successful entry into the new DBS marketplace, continued success
can only be achieved by keeping abreast of such things as
technological improvements, changing consumer demands, and
competitors' actions.2
However, despite these critical success factors, it is
apparent that there are several critical issues that are not
controllable by STC, (see the previous chapter). In other words,
all the critical factors mentioned above could be handled well, and
yet one regulatory delay would more than offset them in a negative
direction.
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On the basis of general business observations and pure
speculation, it seems probable that STC will succeed in its
venture, but over a longer period of time than expected. It seems
likely that minor regulatory delays, technical problems, or inability
to quickly produce low-cost home equipment, will cause the DBS service
to begin more slowly than projected. It seems possible that STC
might not become profitable until the mid-1990's. This type of
trend might cause STC to shift its strategy. For instance, the
firm might focus its efforts on supplying programming to broadcast
and cable TV operators to generate revenues immediately, rather than
waiting for the home market to develop.
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5. Implications for Comsat
Using very general terms, there are three basic scenarios of
the future of STC and Comsat. An optimistic scenario would have
STC's high power DBS service operating successfully in 1986.
Subscribers would sign up at a rapid rate. The venture would
generate annual revenues of two or three hundred million dollars
in 1988 and break-even in the next year or two. This scenario would
have two direct results. First, STC would be able to obtain any
needed financing from external sources and would not need substantial
cash support from Comsat. Second, STC would quickly become the
central business unit at Comsat. The corporate strategy and
organization would change to reflect that Comsat would now be
primarily a competitive, consumer-oriented firm as opposed to a
regulated monopoly selling to very large users.
A counter or pessimistic scenario could be generated by any
number of factors, but basically would have STC beginning its DBS
service after 1987. At that point there might be operational
problems, effective competitors, or just slow market acceptance
of the DBS concept. There would be increasing costs and small
revenues to offset them. Comsat would be faced with pouring more
cash into STC, (if it has the resources), or shutting down the
venture. Either way, the result would be a tremendous blow to
Comsat's reputation.
In addition, although an FCC worst case analysis shows STC
failure not impacting the parent company's monopoly business,
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Comsat's market value would be severely affected.3 As has been
stated earlier, Comsat's monopoly business is in danger of being
opened up to competition, which would significantly reduce revenues
in that area. This is the reason Comsat is expanding into new
competitive areas; to provide a new future for the firm outside
of its basic monopoly business. Yet, if tremendous resources are
poured into STC and it does fail, Comsat will have suffered
tremendous opportunity costs. It will be saddled with a declining
monopoly business, a share in potential SBS profits, and some minor
competitive businesses, but it will not have a thriving core
business to build its future around.
The third, and probably most realistic, scenario is where STC
does become profitable, but later than projected, (see the previous
section). This scenario shows Comsat in a tight cash position in
the mid- to late-1980's. With STC producing small revenues,
Comsat's monopoly business declining, Comsat's competitive
satellite network leases expiring, the manufacturing businesses
still small scale, and Comsat's interest in SBS profits at only
one third, the prospects for Comsat are not that bright. Of course,
this scenario does not include a 50% partner in STC or a booming
SBS business. If either or these events occurs, then Comsat
will be in a much better cash position to handle the longer time
until STC becomes profitable, (1993?).
In conclusion, while the lure of DBS is extremely attractive,
particularly to a satellite-based company such as Comsat, the risks
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are enormous. For Comsat, which is trying to strengthen its
corporation by moving out of the regulated monopoly area to
competitive businesses, the risks are compounded. Comsat appears
to be basing so much of its future in this one venture that severe
difficulties in the DBS area would seriously strain the entire
corporation. This perhaps would not have been the case if STC
had been able to proceed with its plans in 1980. However, it now
seems that an incremental approach to new ventures would be more
in line with a lower-risk, long-term strengthening of the
corporation in the competitive area.
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